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aptivated by Chinese cunning confidence—international leaders watch out for the 
ramifications of her African affairs and the changing world order. In respect of the Sino-
Congolese Co-operation Agreement, China on the overall appears to be more that of a 
developmental partner and far less a cruel conqueror. Several analysts suggest that the 
relationship is more balanced than one might have presumed. Notwithstanding, the pressure 
particularly put on the Democratic Republic of Congo as a laboratory for economic 
advancement, is for the rest of the region to appreciate whether the Chinese framework for 
development can rationalise authoritarian rule in the reconfigured global landscape, by contrast 
of democracy. 
 
The China-Africa relation is one good leap from the Beijing economic reforms. It begins with the 
practical perspective for solutions in the quest for potential sources of raw materials to sustain 
country industrial growth. Africa is but right.1  
 
Subsequently, the logic to leverage in the age of Globalisation, through deepened integration of 
the Chinese economy in cross border trade, travel and tradition. By so doing in just one decade 
of barter, China became the leading trade partner of the African continent with a total market 
share of 10.4% and over 800 Chinese companies doing business with 49 African nations. This 
marked a tenfold increase accomplishment that outperformed the GDP growth in the mainland.2 
Trade infrastructures stipulated in bilateral agreements between Governments, or joint ventures 
between state owned enterprises, are to serve as an alternative eco-political strategy to induce 
structural adjustment, speed up modernisation, strengthen capacity, broaden the scope of 
scientific exploration, alleviate humanitarian conditions and curb armed conflicts.3 
 
Despite a strong resentment of the Congress of South African Trade Unions Cosatu, for fear of 
market infiltration, China gestured meaningfully with the revocation of bilateral debt of 31 
African countries to the value of about USD1.27b. Aside all these she continuously participates in 
financing development initiatives.4 
 
Clearly, China has explicit interest in African mineral wealth and 
has taken action. Whether it is to be understood as a novel 
approach to redress the issues on marginalisation or a starkly bad 
deal in the long term, the magnitude and impact of this 
relationship cannot be ignored.5 What has changed in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo are the following: Minerals 
magnitude, investing infrastructure, defence strategies for conflict 
containment, finally labour and workplace betterment. And for 
other nations up for the same lesson, a mind-set change.  
 
Tenth anniversary stamp of the new regime in 1975, the DRC then known as 
Zaïre issued a postage stamp depicting the historic meeting between President 
Mobutu and Chairman Mao (Source, Putzel L and Kabuyaya N 2011). 
                                                 
1Wasserman H (2012) China in South Africa: A long affair, Africa rising, pp 32-35 
2Daly J (2009). Feeding the Dragon, Chinas quest for African minerals, Washington: The Jamestown Foundation pp. 78-85  
3 Zeleza, PT. 2008. Dancing with the Dragon, Africa‘s courtship with China. The Global South 2(2), pp. 171-187. 
4Wasserman H (2012) China in South Africa: A long affair, Africa rising, pp 32-35 
5 Le Pere, G and Shelton, G. 2007. China, Africa and South Africa. Midrand, South Africa, Institute for Global Dialogue. 
C 
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A VENTURE WORTH  
How did China achieve such a dominating role in Africa, in the DRC especially?  
What did they promise the DRC government? 
 
The very first Chinese-Congo Agreement was in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding 
forged in Beijing sometime in 2007. This was followed with a thorough agreement the following 
year, between Congo and two state owned enterprises: China Railway Group Ltd and Sinohydro 
Corporation.6 The agreement mandates the full cooperation of the Export Import Bank of China.  
 
In a straightforward manner, China vowed commitment for the mobilisation of funds to be used 
for the construction of infrastructure: roads, railways, airports, power stations, housing projects 
and hospitals –and for the development of the mines. Repayment of these investments is to be 
in the form of cobalt and copper deposits extracted from the Kolwezi region located in the 
south eastern province of Katanga.7 Kolwezi is one of the richest areas producing cobalt and 
copper, and is the homeland of Congolese magistrate Kabila. 
 
This agreement stipulates the Congolese Government enterprise Gécamines to give out deposits 
containing up to 10.6m tonnes of copper, and specifies further a volume between 425,000 and 
625,000 tonnes of cobalt.8  Other mineral substances and deposits capable of being developed 
were promised. Mines sites prospect an investment of about USD3b. The first USD375 million 
profit to be derived from Sicomines operations by 2013 is to be appropriated for repayment 
priority infrastructure projects. 85% of the Sicomines profits in excess of the first USD375m are 
appropriated for the repayment of the mining loan followed by the rest of the infrastructure 
loan.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Xinhua (2008). Chinese peacekeepers return home from DR Congo 
7 Collaborative Agreement, April 2008, p.5. 
8 The mineral deposits are listed as: Dikuluwe, Mashamba West, Jonction D, Cuvette Dima, Cuvette Mashamba and Synclinal 
Dikuluwe Colline D. Collaborative Agreement, April 2008, p.8 
Shareholding of mining venture 
(Source, Global Witness 2011)  
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The remaining 15% of the Sicomines profits above the USD375m threshold is to be divided 
among the shareholders of the joint venture. Congolese representation comprised of the 
National Security Advisor Pierre Lumbi, the former Minister of Infrastructure, the Minister of 
Mines Martin Kabwelulu, Gécamines CEO Paul Fortin and representation from the Office of the 
President: Oversight of the Congo-China Programme Coordination Office Moise Ekanga.9 Lumbi 
is the sole Congolese Government signatory, and the eminence grise Augustin Katumba 
Mwanke who consulted the entire negotiations on behalf of Government. 
 
Although the full renegotiated contract has not been published to this date, its review turned 
out as a high risk engagement that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund IMF 
urged for contract renegotiation.10 The Fund postponed approval of a debt relief loan pending 
the revision on the infrastructure-for-minerals agreement with China, on the basis that the 
agreed terms effectually raises the Congolese debt burden. In other words the Sino-Congolese 
agreement does not bring DRC into a debt sustainable position. Alterations were made on the 
debt relief loan which is a public guaranteed debt that slithered to about USD4b from USD13b, 
and the infrastructure-for-minerals agreement with China was slashed to USD6b from the 
original amount of USD9b. An issue of relevance is that the debt relief program stipulates 
financing assurances by the Paris Club of nineteen creditor nations, and includes Canada. 
Canada looked into international arbitration for the resolve on a disputed Congolese 
Government decision to cancel a copper and cobalt project of the Canadian miner First 
Quantum. 11  
 
As far as World Bank and IMF are concerned, it was widely presumed these organisations stood 
with the West to oppose the investments of China in Africa. More since the resource contract 
renegotiations occurred slightly before the first Congolese presidential election in 2006.12 Other 
predicaments include the White House lobby for the Congolese Government to sign a 
moratorium contract with the US mining company Phelps Dodge. In the later year, the American 
corporate lobbyist turned up VP for US Government relations in Africa.13 It is interesting to note 
that the renegotiated agreement through the intervention of IMF has significantly reduced 
Chinese obligations by 33%, and the Congolese infrastructure benefits by 50%, but has not 
touched the scope of the mineral reserves ceded to the Chinese Government China, apparently 
unchanged: copper extraction of 10m tonnes and 600,000 tonnes of cobalt, short of saying 
China gets access to mineral reserves worth over USD50b.14 The forecast revenue on coltan, 
cobalt and copper could be anywhere between USD40b and USD120b, excluding interest and 
capital repayments and the cost of operations. The variables on extraction depend on the 
degree of accessibility and grades of the ore, which in the actual exploit can affect this 
forecast.15 
                                                 
9 Le Potentiel (2010). J. Kabila remanie le gouvernement et son cabinet// World Bank representatives (2008). Global Witness interview 
with former official within the Presidency, Kinshasa// Interview with Faustin Kuediasala 
10 Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies (2009). Asia Briefing: China‘s true intentions in Congo// BBC website (2010). 
Democratic Republic of Congo country profile// Nzongola-Ntalaja G (2010). The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People‘s History, 
Zed Books  
11 Mining Journal Special Publication (2010). Fast improving risk-reward balance, The Democratic Republic of Congo// 
<http://www.miningweekly.com> 
12 DR Congoto adapt China deal to appease IMF (2009) <http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/drc_mining_contracts_113007.pdf> 
13 Evidence of grand corruption mounts in Beijingsshowcase USDb barter deal (2008)  
14 Lee P (2010). China has a Congo copper headache. Asia Times <www.atimes.co 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/LC11Cb02.html> 
15 Wild F (2010). Congos Sicomines confirms extent of copper find. Collaborative agreement, Appendix ABloomberg,  
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At the request of the Congolese magistrate for a minerals contract review by the Carter Center, a 
dispiriting picture of ―Chinese greed, opportunism, and apparent self-dealing at the expense of 
one of the poorest countries on earth,‖ was critiqued.16 The fault is on the 2008 Chinese deal 
that had promised a signing bonus of USD350m on top of the USD9b infrastructure-for-mining-
agreement, for entitlement of 32% shares of the Government enterprise Gecamines.17 
 
Thus the blockbuster USD9.25b resource-for-infrastructure agreement officially proclaimed as 
the Sino-Congolese Co-operation Agreement or SCCA, stipulates USD6b on infrastructure and 
USD3.25b for mining assets. Chinese state owned companies are to invest in the priority 
infrastructure in order to possess rights to nearly 6.8Mt of copper reserves and 627,000t of 
cobalt. Unfortunately Congo endured a plunge in the prices of copper and cobalt early on 2009; 
inflation spiked 100% up to midyear, and the exchange rate depreciated by 45%.18 
Encompassing these events, the facts can be filtered against the backdrop of the soaring prices 
for oil and gold that has helped lift the overall African GDP since 200019 and induced the 
expanding urbanisation of 4.5% annual change. These trends are forecast to remain the same 
until 2015,20 because the mineral resources trade account for one third of the regional economic 
growth.21  
 
 
Gold is the heart of African resources. The continent represents 20% of global average yearly 
production of about 2400MT. The largest gold resource base is in South Africa, producing close 
to 250MT per annum.22 Gold is sought after as a safe investment aside industry and jewellery. 
35% of gold production goes to safe investment which serves as a monetary protection during 
periods of high inflation or when the real rate of return on other investment vehicles is low. 
                                                 
16 DR Congoto adapt China deal to appease IMF (2009) <http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/drc_mining_contracts_113007.pdf> 
17 Lee P (2010). China has a Congo copper headache. Asia Times <www.atimes.co 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/LC11Cb02.html> 
18 Mining Journal Special Publication (2010). Fast improving risk-reward balance, The Democratic Republic of Congo 
19 McKinsey Global Institute (2010). Lions on the move: The progress and potential of African economies <mckinsey.com/mgi> 
20 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html 
21 McKinsey Global Institute (2010). Lions on the move: The progress and potential of African economies <mckinsey.com/mgi> 
22 World Gold Council 2011 
 
Production of Top 15 Gold-Producing Companies, 1999 and 2000 
(Source, Cross and Stigson 2002) 
Company Base 1999 (tonnes) 2000 (tonnes) Employment  (2000) 
 
AngloGold 
Newmont 
Gold Fields Ltd 
Barrick 
Placer Dome 
Rio Tinto 
Homestake 
Harmony 
Normandy 
Freeport Moran 
Ashanti Goldfields 
Durban Roodepoort 
Kinross 
Buenaventura 
Newcrest 
 
South Africa 
US 
South Africa 
Canada 
Canada 
UK 
US 
South Africa 
Australia 
US 
Ghana 
South Africa 
Canada 
Peru 
Australia 
 
215.2 
130.0 
118.7 
113.8 
97.9 
92.9 
74.3 
41.4 
58.8 
74.0 
48.6 
27.7 
31.3 
23.6 
26.3 
 
225.3 
153.7 
121.2 
116.4 
92.8 
84.9 
68.6 
66.8 
64.5 
59.1 
54.0 
35.7 
29.4 
28.5 
27.9 
 
77,600 
10,800 
55,000 
5,500 
12,000 
5,100 
n/a 
42,600 
n/a 
7,800 
10,400 
19,111 
1,600 
1,800 
n/a 
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China takes lead in the global gold production and is followed by the US, Australia, South Africa 
and Russia.23 India and China, together account for half of the gold consumed in recent years.24    
 
Gold is likely to lead the growth of minerals trade forecast at 13.7% across the key mining sub-
sectors. Gold production is forecast at 25.7% growth resulting new projects from Anglo Gold 
Ashanti and Randgold in Orientale province. These growth rates however can drastically change 
as a result of constrained mining activities, for unstable supply of power, poor transportation, 
deficiency in processing infrastructure, and disruptions from militant groups.25 
 
And as expected, the journey of China in Congolese soil comes with unique political frenzy. On 
the international scene, the impositions of the IMF on Congolese President Kabila for contract 
adjustments to stipulate USD11b in debt relief and the deferment of the second USD3b 
infrastructure tranche.26 At national level, the protest against the mining minister is put forward 
by 150 members of the national parliament, for participation in the infrastructure-for-mining-
agreement. On the local level, a cease operations order on Chinese firms in the export of 
unprocessed ores was put out by the governor of Katanga. Even at one point, the Sinohydro 
mining project in North Kivu was ambushed by heavily armed men, in retaliation of serious 
labour malpractice. This instruction traced back to military renegade General Laurant Nkunda.27  
 
UNEP described Congo as the poorest and most violent country on earth. A failed state, rape 
capital of the world, if not the personification of humanitarian catastrophe. But beneath the 
surface its dark earth holds USD24 trillion worth of coltan, cobalt and, the blood and bones of 
information age manufacturing. 28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
23 World Gold Council 2011 
24 McKinsey Global Institute (2010). Lions on the move: The progress and potential of African economies <mckinsey.com/mgi> 
25 The African Report http://www.theafricareport.com/images/stories/cprofile2012_drc_copperproduction.jpg 
26 Lee P (2010). China has a Congo copper headache. Asia Times <www.atimes.co 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/LC11Cb02.html> 
27 Holslag J (2010). Chinas true intentions in Congo. Perspectives, Harvard International Review, Cambridge 
28Le Potentiel (2010). J. Kabila remanie le gouvernement et son cabinet// World Bank representatives (2008). Global Witness 
interview with former official within the Presidency, Kinshasa// Interview with Faustin Kuediasala 
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MINERALS MAGNITUDE 
 
Twenty-four trillion dollars is nearly 40% of the world economy. Therefore above all the fighting, 
the Beijing strategy of mutual benefit intends to blaze African resources to enlarge her 
motherland state economy, using a linchpin of Chinese infrastructure projects built on African 
soil.29  
 
Last decade witnessed the big mining explorations move into Congo for its vast mineral wealth. 
A ballpark figure is that nearly 10% of the world reserves of copper, 33% of all reserves of cobalt, 
and 34% of coltan reserves are found within Congo. The country is also the principal source for 
gold, diamonds, cadmium, cassiterite, silver, wolframite and uranium.30 
 
 
On the whole, China perceives Africa as 
a natural addition of the on-going 
resources-for-infrastructure strategy, 
first introduced in Angola on a USD2b 
give, then a USD3b engagement in 
Gabon. These followed with parallel 
arrangements in Guinea and Zimbabwe 
for commitments between USD7 and 
USD8 billion. Now these Congolese 
resources come openly recognised by 
China as nothing but a good 
opportunity tantamount to transform a 
scarcely developed nation into a 
motivating economic force.31  
 
Without need for emphasis, mineral 
products have become a vital 
component of modern economies and 
societies. With the many forms metals 
take in industrial and consumer 
applications, consumption per capita 
has been positively correlated with per 
capita GDP. A visible divide among 
countries is defined at a per capita GDP 
of USD10,000. More countries fall below this demarcation for consumption per capita less than 
6kg aluminium, 5kg copper, and 200kg steel. Those nations above the demarcation indicate a 
quite high per capita mineral consumption, but mask the usage of semi-fabricating industries 
serving export markets.32 Semi-fabricating industries, usually shortened to s-e-m-i-s, are those 
                                                 
29 Wasserman H (2012) China in South Africa: A long affair, Africa rising, pp 32-35 
30 Mining Journal Special Publication (2010). Unwanted legacy, The Democratic Republic of Congo 
31 Meyer N (2012) Can Chinas Deal of the century save Congo? World policy around the table// Mining Journal Special Publication 
(2010). Fast improving risk-reward balance, The Democratic Republic of Congo 
32 CRU International (2001) Precious metals market outlook. London 
0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 
10 
100 
1 
0.1 
                  GDP PER CAPITA USD 
 
 
Copper per capita intensity of use 
(World Bureau of Metal Statistics/ World Bank 1999) 
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into manufacturing processes to combine gold into sheet alloys, tube or wire and done by 
specialist large refiners of Germany, Switzerland or other well developed states.33 
 
To some extent, the Chinese strategy is thought as a possible means to improve the standard of 
living of 71m Congolese people.34 For one, China has become an overwhelming force in the 
minerals market with an exploding trend in electronics manufacture. Visibly, the sheer appetite 
of coltan doubles that of 1980s trend has accelerated the Chinese global trade accession35 and 
to some extent influenced on the mineral kingpins. Between 1990 and 2000, China occupied 
one-third of world total consumption of coltan, of which 60% are import concentrates. For the 
sea borne market for iron ore, the country usage of China moved up 16% from 4%, to occupy 
60% of world consumption. Recent trends show country aluminium usage has increased by 
40%.36 The worldwide total consumption for aluminium in 2012 is 3,919 thousand metric tonnes 
and China has consumed 1,762MT.37 
 
Coltan is a metallic ore typically sought for its tantalum content. Coltan is the coined word for 
columbite‐tantalite, which is broadly used for capacitors in electronic circuits. Its mineral 
properties allow the flow of electric charges and storage, with negligible energy loss. A mineral 
that is extremely useful in the industries of aviation, defence, medical technology, and for other 
consumer commodities requiring resistance to severe heat and chemical corrosion, hardness 
and ductility.38  
Typically, with regards to minerals usage, the prices of coltan is privately negotiated, which 
include the purchase contracts between buyer and seller are definitely confidential. Coltan prices 
are mainly influenced by events in the supply of and demand for minerals. The published spot 
prices by the United States Geological Survey indicate long-term stability, but disrupted by very 
sharp price jumps, resulting the strong demand and shortage. Coltan is a strategic resource to 
                                                 
33 http://info.goldavenue.com 
34 Meyer N (2012) Can Chinas Deal of the century save Congo? World policy around the table 
35 DRC. Ma T (2009). China and Congo‘s coltan connection. Project 2049 Institute, pp 2-6 
36 Humphreys D (2001b) The role of China in the world mining industry, China mining 2001 conference, Xian, Shaanxi Province 
37http://www.world-aluminium.org/statistics 
38Ma T (2009). China and Congo‘s coltan connection. Project 2049 Institute, pp 2-6   
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many countries. In China, coltan usage is controlled by state owned enterprises, and recently, 
the research in defence manufacturing. The chief minerals processor Ningxia Nonferrous Metals 
Smeltery: NNMS is the sole research centre occupied in hydrogen bomb production.39 UN 2008 
report states China has moved up as the key consumer of Congolese coltan exports which are 
shipped to NNMS.40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Demand for coltan on a global scale has escalated at about 6% annually since 1990, and is 
forecast for 6.75% growth in the Asia Pacific.41 Three quarters of the world coltan supplies are 
sourced from mining activities and the remaining quarter are reclaimed from tin slag; scrap 
metals, and existing inventories. In 2008, the world tantalum supplies estimate a total of 4.3 
million pounds.42 Africa and Australia are presently on top of the world supply, each continent 
contributing 30%. Brazil contributes 15% and China for 8%.43 The bulk of export from Central 
Africa supposedly originates from the Congo.44  
 
As it is, China principal importer of tantalum produced in the African region, to a value of USD 
36.3m in 2009. Yet direct imports from the Democratic Republic of Congo are little compared to 
other suppliers like Rwanda. China imports 73% of all tantalum and niobium ores trade of the 
region. Trade from Rwanda in 2008 is roughly 4.6 times the amount of Rwanda production, 
                                                 
39 Ma T (2009). China and Congo‘s coltan connection. Project 2049 Institute, pp 2-6 
40 Ewing J (2008). Congo fighting revives tainted phone fears. Business Week 
<http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/nov2008/gb20081117_671426.htm?chan=top+news_top+news+index+‐+temp_
global+business> 
41Global Industry Analysts, Inc (2008). Global tantalum market to exceed 6.95 million pounds by 2012. 
<http://www.prweb.com/releases/tantalum/metal/prweb1530774.htm> 
42 Wallwork P (2008). Challenges facing the tantalum industry. Presentation at the minor metals and rare earths conference, 
<http://www.talison.com.au/news.html> 
43 Noventa (2009). Introduction to Noventa. Presentation on March 26, 2009, <http: 
//noventa.net/pdf/Proactive_Investors_Presentation_26March2009.pdf.> 
44 Ma T (2009). China and Congo‘s coltan connection. Project 2049 Institute, pp 2-6 
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which suggests an estimate of 914t of these minerals are smuggled product representing a 
market share of 55%.45 In comparison to Hong Kong or Singapore, Chinese imports are less 
pricey at USD11.33 per kg tantalum and niobium ore, versus USD24.26 paid by other Asian 
importers.46  
 
Congolese prices for coltan continuously escalate since 2007 while export prices have been 
decreasing compared other countries within the region. Then prices for coltan at Rwanda are 
kept constantly low. But China purchased coltan for even less than USD8 per kg while exports 
from Rwanda cost between USD13 and USD31 per kg on the average, depending on tantalum 
grading.47 Other reports suggest that the price of Chinese imports from Rwanda is 2 or 2.7 times 
less the import price of Australian tantalite, and 3.7 times lower during the first six months of 
2009. 48  
 
A logistics supply chain of coltan from DRC is smuggled via Rwanda or other Central African 
Countries, and then bought by Chinese processors often smaller companies.49 
 
The ILO, International Labour Organization information on extractive industries from 73 
countries extending at least 10 years back, confirms 30m people worldwide in mining for both 
large and small scale, and about 300 million particularly for metals recycling. A huge 
concentration of employment is in Asia at 60%, while the South Africa mining industry 
represents 2.7% of the economically active population of 1999. Employment slowdown is clearly 
illustrated in South Africa, where 360,000 mineworkers, or 46% of industry work force lost jobs 
between 1990 and 2000. The US mining industry plunged 31% between 1985 and 2000, 
activities in coal having the largest decrease of 60%. Over the same period, employment across 
major steel producing countries has fallen from around 2.5 million to fewer than 900,000 people. 
This does not include China. China employs about 26% of the total worldwide workforce. For 
steel alone, employment in galvanizing is about 85,000 people.50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 Roskill (2009). The economics of tantalum, 10th edition, London <www.roskill.com> 
46 Tantalum-Niobium International Study Center (2010). Bulletin n. 144, ISSN 1019-20296 
47 Garrett and Mitchell (2009). Trading conflict for development, DFID, LSE, CRG 
48 Roskill (2009). The economics of tantalum, 10th edition, London <www.roskill.com> 
49 Gylfason (2009). Development and growth in mineral-rich countries, Greenleaf Publisher, pp 42-84 
50 Quoted in Breaking new ground: ILO (2001) Labour statistics database, Geneva/ ILO (2001) Mining coal and other mining, Sectoral 
Activities, Geneva 
The Changing World Order: China s cooptive conquest of the Congolese conflict coltan   12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A majority of roads in the Congo are unpaved and poorly maintained especially if these are far from 
the capital of Kinshasa or any mining operation 
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As a matter of fact the road network is outperformed by its 2,490km of railroad and 9,300 mi of 
navigable inland waterways 
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INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS 
 
Poor infrastructure is one unique experience in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, given its 
size as the second largest country in Africa and the eleventh largest in the world by area of 2 
345 409 km2 or 905 355 sq mi. It is the 19th largest by population of 73m but with only 2 794 
km or 1 398 mi of good paved road.  Only half of that is in good condition. A majority of roads 
in the Congo are unpaved and poorly maintained especially if these are far from the capital of 
Kinshasa or any mining operation. Roads in remote areas are often built farm roads by private 
individuals or earth tracks carved by church communities, and are in better condition than the 
Congolese national road system.  Most roads can be described as dirt tracks where armed 
soldiers usually come with a request for payment. Bicycles are the main method of land 
transportation and even trucks break down constantly and can be stuck for months. As a matter 
of fact the road network is outperformed by its 2,490km of railroad and 9,300 mi of navigable 
inland waterways.51 
 
With little Government money put into road improvements, the bureaucracy has turned to 
foreign investments, for which the Sino Chinese Co-operation Agreement reflects in the 2010 
state budget as follows: Transport railways USD195.400m, road construction and rehabilitation 
USD396.642m, farming 500 tractors USD26.405m, water utilities USD211.244m, and energy 
sector USD190.088m.52 The complete planned infrastructure development works lists three 
railways, thirteen connecting roads specifically with a road network in Kinshasa. One hospital to 
every province and one health centre in every district, two universities and 5,000 homes. Total 
investment expenditure is estimated at USD6.5b. Funding assistance provides also for the 
construction of stadiums, government buildings, telecommunications networks and other 
infrastructure;53 such as the Brazzaville's radio and television network which was the work of a 
Chinese company.54 More of the road network includes new secondary offshoots for easy 
travelling of hundreds of Congolese workers from homes to jobsites.  
 
China State Construction Engineering Corporation, CSCEC is building, and Jean Jacques Bouya 
sits managing director of the state firm for large infrastructure projects.55 Work commenced on 
a USD500m, 600 km road link from the oil hub of Pointe-Noire on the coast to the capital, 
Brazzaville.56 The new airport of Mbanza Congo is expected to advance the city of Mbanza 
Congo with its 4,000 metres runway and 2,000 metres access the main road.57 Along these tasks, 
China has built a new foreign ministry facility, and supports business investments.58 At the end 
of 2005, China Export Import Bank Ltd had cumulatively funded only about USD800m in 
concessional loans in Africa for 55 projects. Two years later, the number of African projects had 
risen to 87, and the cumulative value was about USD1.5b. At the end of 2006, Chinese leaders 
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announced that EXIM would release USD2b in concessional loans and USD3b in preferential 
export credits available for Africa.59 
 
China Development Bank also offers policy loans at competitive rates. As of March 2007, China 
Development Bank reported that it had financed 30 projects in Africa, for a total of about 
USD1b. Three and a half years later, it had committed more than USD10b to projects in Africa 
and disbursed USD5.6b in financing to 35 projects across over 30 African nation.60 The Chinese 
have linked the aid funding to the United Nations summits on financing the Millennium 
Development Goals, and meetings of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, FOCAC.61 
Infrastructure improvement besides thousands of miles in new roads and railways includes: a 
modern 450 bed hospital in Kinshasa, 31 hospitals in 26 provinces of 150 beds each, 145 health 
centres each with 50 beds, two hydroelectric plants; power lines, two vocational training centres 
for construction and public works sectors, and two universities.62The completion of the 120-MW 
Imboulou hydroelectric dam on the Lefini River, which began in 2003, is contracted by two 
Chinese companies: CMEC and CIEMCO.63 A hydroelectric plant with capacity of 150MW is 
located in Zongo II in Bas-Congo and 64MW plant at Grande Katende in Kasaï 
Occidental.64 Construction of the plant extends to the USD3b power lines stretching from Inga 
to Kolwezi in south eastern Katanga province and on to Witkop, South Africa, about 3,600 
kilometres away. Several companies including the China Three Gorges Corp and Sinohydro, 
Posco and Daewoo Corp have partnered with Canadian SNC-Lavalin Group Inc for a second bid. 
Actividades de Construccion y Servicios SA, based in Madrid, and the Spanish Eurofinsa Group 
have submitted a third bid.65  
 
Early 2013 Chinese engineers have installed an under river fibre cable to link the capitals 
Brazzaville and Kinshasa. An event held to celebrate the fibre deployment Telecommunications 
and New Technologies, and the combined conurbation of Kinshasa-Brazzaville, which is divided 
by the Congo River. These significant political and infrastructure challenges prevent the two 
cities from functioning with any meaningful kind of connection to around twelve million 
inhabitants, although.66 An international report summarises the Congolese achievement in 
infrastructure improvements as follows: Increased domestic connectivity and renewal of aircraft 
fleet in the Air Transport Sector, High level of GSM signal coverage at reasonable cost for ICT, 
and on port, Port of Matadi made available to service Kinshasa area. On power production, vast 
low-cost hydropower resources and potential to become major exporter, on railways, new 
strategic networks available to support timber and mineral exports, and for roads, progress in 
mobilizing external finance for network reconstruction. For water and sanitation there is a 
rapidly expanding access to improved latrines.67  
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Chinese contractors walk past Congolese workers 
(Katrina Manson 2010)  
The Changing World Order: China s cooptive conquest of the Congolese conflict coltan   17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Héxié Shèhuì is the vision of Chinese President Hu Jintao, which would mean to build a peaceful, 
prosperous world 
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LABOUR ETHICS AND WORK PLACE PRACTICES 
 
和谐社会 Héxié Shèhuì is the vision of Chinese President Hu Jintao, which would mean to build 
a peaceful and prosperous world, and the emphasis if the China Olympics season. To express 
sincerity on such concept, as regards economic activities in Africa, China Institute of 
International Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce engaged the consultative services of French 
organisation Rights and Accountability in Development, RAID to unfold mutual respect amongst 
workers on site the state-owned enterprises and larger companies operating inside the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. 
 
It must be noted that the Communist Party of China Central Committee first launched the 
concept of harmonious socialist society at the Fourth Plenary Session in September 2004, and 
was followed through by Hu Jintao with a series of discussion in the Chinese Political 
Consultative Conference in March 2005.68 Below outlines the survey conducted on 15% of the 
Chinese firms operating in the Democratic Republic of Congo.69 
 
Main Problems: Perspective of Congolese workers 
 
• Chinese companies have little or no understanding not only of 
international labour standards but also of Congolese law, in particular 
the Code du Travail and the Mining Code  
• Environmental standards are not respected by Chinese companies 
• Accidents in Chinese-run smelters are commonplace because of the 
lack of protective clothing, training and procedures 
• Workers who sustain serious injuries as a result of accidents at work 
do not receive adequate medical attention; compensation is often 
inadequate or non-existent 
• Minerals bought for processing or sold to trading houses are 
illegally mined with the use of child labour; children, some as young 
as 10 years old, load bags in the trading houses 
• Workers are exposed to harmful dust from the minerals handled – 
including radioactive minerals; they are not provided with face masks 
or other protective clothing; there are no facilities for taking a shower 
• Workers work long hours, are treated arbitrarily and risk being 
summarily dismissed for trivial offences or on false accusations 
• Chinese and Congolese security guards have assaulted workers and 
beatings are common. In some cases workers have sustained serious 
injuries 
• Most workers are hired on a casual basis and the companies do not 
pay their insurance. Workers with contracts complain that these are 
written in Chinese and not translated 
• Congolese workers are discriminated against; are given menial jobs 
and have no opportunities to upgrade their skills. They do not receive 
the same levels of pay as Chinese workers 
• Workers are not treated with respect and are regarded as 
dispensable 
• Workers‘ grievances are not taken seriously by the company and 
making complaints often leads to dismissal  
•Corruption and inefficiency undermines the work of the Congolese 
police, labour inspectors and the courts. Workers have no access to 
an effective remedy 
• Chinese companies and Chinese employees appear to be above the 
law 
 
Main Problems: Perspective of Chinese Employees 
 
• Chinese workers are at risk of assault by gangs; some attacks 
are racially motivated; some Chinese employees have been 
seriously wounded 
• Threats to their personal security means Chinese employees 
do not go out much and stay in their compounds 
• Buildings where Chinese expatriate workers are housed are 
often targeted by thieves 
• Chinese face constant harassment from Congolese officials 
who extort money from them on the slightest pretext: for 
example, that their visas are not valid 
• Corrupt officials try to impose fines on Chinese companies or 
demand payment of ‗taxes without due cause 
• Living conditions for many Chinese workers are poor 
• Many are unhappy and would prefer to work in neighbouring 
African countries where corruption and security problems are 
less prevalent 
• Pervasive corruption makes it difficult to do business and 
bring prosperity to the region 
• Chinese companies are supposed to add value by processing 
minerals inside Katanga but they see no sign of the mining 
revenues being used by the Congolese authorities to improve 
local infrastructure or the living conditions of the population 
• Chinese people are the victims of the frustration that the 
Congolese population feel as a result of their neglect by the 
Congolese Government 
• They would like to have better relations with Congolese 
people but there are language and other barriers that need to 
be overcome 
• Chinese employees do not feel that their human rights are 
respected and that the Chinese embassy, in cooperation with 
the Congolese authorities, should take action to tackle these 
problems. 
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INVESTMENT IMPACT 
Did the people of the DRC benefit from Chinese investments? 
 
A forward looking foreign policy of Chinese diplomacy in Africa is a challenge for regional and 
global change. The weight of historical context suggests continuities of political economy to 
mark Chinese foreign policy out from western approaches.70 A wider range of monetary and 
nonmonetary assistance71 through three instruments; grants, zero interest loans, and 
concessional fixed rate or low interest loans. All these are apart the infrastructure-for-resources-
agreement,72 but do not carry the 'good governance' conditionalities.73  
 
China disbursed about USD1.2b in Official Development Aid: ODA, compared with the World 
Bank USD4.1b, the United States USD7.2b and France USD3.4 b. Disbursements in relation to 
assistance increased to USD1.4b in 2009.74 For scholastic contributions and the advancement of 
the academe, the Chinese Government funds 5500 scholarships for African students each year. 
Social foundations seed in China's peacekeeping medical missions,75  training programs and 
youth volunteers,76 and about USD600,000 in humanitarian aid to refugees in the eastern part of 
Congo.77 In the succeeding five years a thousand doctors, nurses and managers are to be 
trained for the health sector receiving hospitals,78 USD37.5m worth of anti-malaria drug 
artemisinin, and 30 malarial prevention and treatment centres are to be built.79 
 
Another perspective highlights trade flows and foreign direct investments, FDI. Trade relations 
established through foreign policy has resulted positive impact on trade flows and FDI to the 
benefit of the Congolese. With the economic stagnation in the west, a trade boom across the 
globe is possible. Plainly put, the minerals demand of China has positive returns to Congo, and 
the risk of competition remote.80  
 
Indication of economic growth of about 6.5% is broadly associated to the infrastructure-for-
resources agreement.  Copper production of 500,000tn is two times more the total in 2009. 
Cobalt production nearly doubled between 2010 and 2011, reaching 100,000tn, while the 
production of zinc reached 9,200tn in the first six months of 2011, which is the usual production 
achieved in a full year.  
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FDI infused in mining operations at Katanga province are as follows: Sicomines USD2.15b, 
Tenke-Fungurume Mining USD1.6–2b,  Kingamyambo Musonoi Tailings USD700m, Frontier 
USD300m, and others: Chemaf, Ruashi Mining, Boss Mining USD200–300m, Fortune Ahead 
Hong Kong or Sodimico USD60m, Compagnie Minière de Luisha or COMILU USD60m. Other 
Chinese companies operating in the mining and minerals indutry are: Congo Dong Bang Mining, 
Jia Xing, Feza, Huachin, Congo, Loyal Will Mining, COTA, Luc Ndubula Mining and Kamoto 
Copper Company.81 
 
The overall structural shift through these strategic investments have advanced the construction 
industry to register GDP growth at 10.1% in 2010; followed with developments in agriculture, coffee 
production and logging. Exports soared to USD11bn with minerals and oil comprising 97.2% of the 
total export value, and the Congolese Central Bank foreign reserves enlarged to USD1.3bn in 2010.82 
Improving health is facilitated with the rehabilitation of hospital facilities in all territories through a 
fund appropriation of USD15.315m. And, security of these investment and safety of the mining 
operations is tackled through the military backing of USD2.313m. These subsidies for military activity 
are considered a gift, and therefore these amounts do not reflect on rural development reports.83 
 
The Democratic Republic of Congo has potential to become the largest power exporter in Africa. It 
currently supplies a modest amount of power to Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa.84 The Inga III 
hydropower plant also supplies 2,500 megawatts of power to South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia. 
 
After SCCA, Congo was formally accepted into the EITI: Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 
an organization of governments, companies and civil society groups worldwide. The EITI mandates 
the global standards for transparency in oil, gas and mining, and works across 30 resource-rich 
countries. Members of the EITI publish reports on payments to the state by companies and payments 
by government agencies that are overseen by a multi-stakeholder group.85  
 
China and the DRC Government ratified the international human rights standards which includes the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child consequently such that provisions are respected by all companies operating in Katanga. 
The action highlighted many of the key standards of the International Labour Organisation, ILO 
Convention 100 and Convention 111 on the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment 
and occupation and Convention 138 Minimum Age Convention and Convention 182 Worst Forms of 
Child Labour.86 The move in this direction recognised the Héxié Shèhuì vision of Chinese President 
Hu Jintao, which was first at the Fourth Plenary Session in September 2004 by the Communist Party 
of China Central Committee. 
 
Increasingly, major mining investments in the DRC are governed by conventions rather than by 
contracts. A number of experts in the mining industry view the SCCA as a positive development 
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for the Congolese, with China entering the mining industry, a domain previously dominated by 
European, Canadian and US multinational companies.87 
 
In 2007, Chinese telecommunications giant ZTE and the DRC Ministry of Agriculture forged an 
agreement for the development of oil palm plantations earlier abandoned in Bandundu and 
Equateur, to the tune of USD1b. But controversy lingers on the area of three million hectares on 
paper against its actual area of 100 000 hectares,88  Investing in agricultural research and the 
development of a fertiliser factory and the presidential model farm in NDjili, has mobilised 
private funds toward the potential demands for large-scale agricultural development, especially 
in bio fuel production.89 
 
Nuance of the changing world order is clearly demonstrated in the pressure play against the 
Chinese Global minerals trade. American based companies have boycott minerals originating 
from the Congo conflict. At present, the Global minerals trade gravitates to the United States, 
being the largest consumer of electronics. Supporting the boycott is underway review by the 
Malaysia Smelting Corporation, the largest smelter of Congolese tin, and the Congolese trade 
hubs of Goma and Bukavu. These repercussions push Congolese business associations, 
obviously unable to immediately shift markets to pressure the Government to demilitarise 
mining areas and begin certifying non-conflict minerals. Otherwise a sustained boycott of 
American companies could put tens of thousands of miners out of work and divert trade toward 
India.90 
 
Contradictions of progress also reach the local scene where provincial leaders continue to 
push Kinshasa to honour the stipulations of the 2005 constitution mandating that 40% of 
government revenue is to be funnelled through local and regional governments. This is apart 
the strikes by judges, teachers and even CENI personnel, all stemming from the lack of trickle-
down impact from the country's growth and weak budget execution.91 As a matter of fact, the 
Congolese remark frequently on these infrastructure improvements as the progress that benefits 
mostly the narrow elite. As it is, these high rise structures, restaurants, internet cafés and bars 
are far too expensive for the average city dweller. Life has gotten harder since cost of living has 
gone up.92 Fair conditions at work are another dreadful reality. Although Sicomines is expected 
to employ 10 000 workers, 70% are expected to be Chinese. Then compensation of a Congolese 
casual labourer is about FC 8000 or USD8.85 per day.93  The SCCA has already led to the 
displacement of illegal artisanal miners, which was carried out by a division of the Ministry of Mines, 
whereas local residents lose homes and access to resources. Even at one point, about 200 local 
residents were evicted and given plastic sheeting, but no compensation.94 
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Generally, workers earn about USD80 a month for carrying bags of minerals, crushing ore, 
loading bags, for on average nine hours a day, six days a week. Workers have a few benefits but 
not basic things like a meal at lunch-time or permanent contracts, not even for workers with the 
company for more than a year. One worker from Likasi, found a position in Kolwezi which is over 
200 km away and a four hour journey by bus. He works seven days a week and earns USD80 per 
month. The company allows him to sleep on site. During the day he works as a handyman doing 
whatever task is required and at night he takes a turn guarding the depot. The money he gets 
he sends to his family. Workers at Song Hua receive USD100 a month for a three-day week of 
between 36 and 39 hours. Their Chinese counterparts get paid USD1500. The Congolese deeply 
resent this disparity. Workers do not have medical care and walk one-and-a half hours each way 
to and from work otherwise pay for transport. The management dismiss any complaints on 
discriminating compensation with the reply: We are Chinese.95 
 
Jean, a former foundry worker described conditions at Jia Xing. The company buys minerals 
which are processed at the plant in Lubumbashi. Foundry workers work 12 hours non-stop. A 
short break on site is allowed for workers to eat but is often interrupted and sent back to work. 
Day shifts alternate with night shifts, and fondeurs get USD120 a month and if they work at the 
furnace they receive a bonus of USD100. The equipment is light and of poor quality. It is not 
replaced when worn out. Jia Xing employs about 100 Congolese and 100 Chinese workers and a 
degree of solidarity exists between them. In Huachin, Lubumbashi, shifts last between nine and 
12 hours a day, six or seven days a week. Some work night shifts. The average pay is USD100 per 
month. Workers do not have any protective equipment. They are given the equivalent of about 
50 cents USD to buy food during the break; night shift workers are given six dry biscuits to keep 
them going.96 
 
Children and young adults aged between 12 and 18 years old can be seen at the depots 
everyday trying to sell minerals. They push bikes overloaded with bags, weighing between 70 
and 90kg each, which they unload at the depots where the minerals are then inspected. If the 
Chinese trader is not interested in buying, the bags are refilled and painstakingly loaded back 
onto the bicycles and taken elsewhere. The boys often work either for a negociant or as part of a 
family group. Mothers and younger siblings wash minerals in the murky river, the fathers dig 
and crush the ore, or collect minerals from mine sites illegally at night. The older boys go from 
door to door trying to find a buyer.97 ZTE pays part-time labourers between USD2 and USD3.50 
per day, depending on the vigour‘ of the worker. A driver might earn up to USD180 per 
month. The company pays medical bills if an employee gets sick or is injured on the job. 
Payment for clearing land, by the hectare, is around USD50. The company engages about 100 
workers on a casual basis.98 Of course, Magistrates shield bad employers: Any complaint to work 
inspectors or the competent Congolese authority seems to be useless. Magistrates protect bad 
employers who use bribery to escape the legal consequences of company actions. Corruption is 
pervasive throughout the system.99 
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WHY AFRICA AND DRC? 
 
The nature of the involvement of China in Africa can be appreciated in the context of the severe 
resources race, where the US, India and China are the kingpins vying for security of supply.100 
The massive infrastructure development is to ensure operating performance of the handful of 
state enterprises in the long term, aside ease of influence on Government. True to form, 
infrastructure is rudimentary to the superior performance of a metropolis or country. But a good 
logistics infrastructure system, across the different modes of transportation, requires constant 
investments by Government for country competitiveness, and the actual conditions of public 
infrastructure is a critical success factor.101  
 
China has chosen to be in the Democratic Republic of Congo is for a number of reasons. Of 
course obviously, the country is conveniently disadvantaged yet persuasively attractive, all the 
more from the perspective of a formidable nation. Congo is a country scarred in years of conflict 
that any tiny amount of tangible improvement on the land would come as a noticeable 
accomplishment, and very useful. From an economic standpoint, the equivalent trade flows, FDI 
and multiplier effect on labour and money flows. Any tangible improvement shall create a 
resounding impact that might not come to equal value should the same amount be invested in 
developed a nation or for that matter in China. Conflict and corruption are the fog that eases 
trade accession, after all befriending the magistrate is what matters most and for all the rest are 
to follow.    
 
A political economy is facilitated with the extensive assistance consists a combination of state-
sponsored investments, development aid, loans, and technical assistance that bolstered 
China‘s diplomatic presence and economic influence. This financing infrastructure is thought 
as a soft power in the developing world which has ushered considerable international goodwill. 
The fact of the matter is Chinese assistance and investment has touched on several unmet 
development needs of specific countries relatively neglected by major aid providers. By so, the 
Chinese policy of providing economic assistance: without conditions but specifically for long 
term leeway, has undermined the ability of western aid donors to influence behaviours of 
country recipients in the more critical dimensions democracy, human rights, and economic 
reforms.102 
 
The match is a pair of complimenting nations with strengths and weakness that augment; 
essentially all what is left to achieve is cultural tolerance and compromise. China can be envied 
for superfluous liquidity and by force of habit would strategically invest state resources. At the 
same time her most strenuous concern would be the preservation of whatever is left of the 
natural resource. Congo nearly the exact opposite is indebted and financially incapable of 
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running state affairs. Any Foreign Direct Investment could place Congolese resources to better 
use. It is to note that DRC is strategically situated at the middle of eight other countries which 
could serve as secondary markets.  
 
A weak rule of law in Congo with rebels in small formations is unlike the compelling leadership 
tradition of China, who has overcome earlier years of conflict, famine and isolation. Insofar 
politically, there is no strong relation with democratic or AID related influences. Otherwise there 
would be too much burden for the brouhaha of welfare requirements, public consent and 
equality that the real work building a nation is ambushed along the way. 
 
Chinese diplomacy in Africa ultimately marks a foreign policy out from western approaches, by 
contrast of democracy, the motivation of a political economy that specifically does not carry the 
good governance conditionalities. Insofar as continuity is a tradition of great importance in 
Chinese culture and given the size, state and scale of natural resources of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, many opportunities are expected to surface. Notwithstanding, policy 
coherence has to be given priority to intertwine development initiatives and economic 
advancement, and for genuine structural changes to take effect. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
China has in many years prepared for opportunity of Global leadership, and her chance now is 
for the taking. In conceptual conquest of Congo to change country conditions for the better is a 
choice well within circumstance, little else cultural clairvoyance. Chance is defined as what occurs 
unpredictably without discernible human intention or observable cause and that the outcome is 
decided by chance. 
 
The Peoples Republic China is indisputably the transformative force of ubiquitous economic 
influence, expressing both ambitions of supremacy and tempered harmony. Although the gift of 
foresight has seen China through many lessons of change, the potential impact of Chinese 
benevolence on Africa is determined solely by the structural and institutional conditions of the 
Congolese culture. 
 
The minerals magnitude of China recognises twenty-four trillion dollars, nearly 40% of the world 
economy. Therefore above all the fighting, the Beijing strategy of mutual benefit intends to 
blaze African resources to enlarge her motherland state economy, using a linchpin of Chinese 
infrastructure projects built on African soil 
 
Notwithstanding, the pressure particularly put on the Democratic Republic of Congo as a 
laboratory for economic advancement, is for the rest of the region to appreciate whether the 
Chinese framework for development can rationalise authoritarian rule in the reconfigured global 
landscape, by contrast of democracy. 
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